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Costs of Financial Intermediation Under Regulations: 
Commercial Banks and Development Banks 
Carlos E. Cuevas* 
1. Introduction 
Knowledge of the characteristics of the production technology of 
financial institutions is essential for the analysis of market structure 
and institutional performance. Many regulatory and managerial decisions 
are based on specific assumptions about economies of scale and other 
features of the cost-output relationships prevailing in these institu-
tions. Consequently, in recent years several studies on the banking 
system of the u.s. and other developed economies have been concerned 
with the technological features of financial institutions, particularly 
with the measurement of scale economies and cost complementarities in 
the production of financial services.1f However, very few attempts have 
been made to analyze these cost-output relationships in financial insti-
tutions operating in less-developed countries. In th~~e countries, a 
substantial degree of regulation usually prevails thus making the 
knowledg" ,,f the production structure of financial institutions even 
more important, in order to assess the likely consequences of regulatory 
decisions. 
Studies on development banks in less-developed countries by Gheen, 
and Nyanin, have provided very limited insights into the characteristics 
of the cost strncL·u:e and underlying technology of these institutions, 
due to the choice of very restrictive functional forms for the cost 
* I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement of Professors 
Uou3las H. ~raham and Dale W Adams of the Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Ohio State University. 
1/ See for example, Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey; Mullineaux; Murray 
and White; Panzar and Willig (1977). For a review of the pre-1970 
literature, see Benqton. 
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function. In general, the use of Cobb-Douglas or CES specifications 
implies the adoption of highly restrictive assumptions about the tech-
nology utilized by financial intermediaries. Under these specifica-
tiona, scale economies are forced to remain constant, regardless of the 
output level, therefore the corresponding average cost curves are either 
downward or upward sloping throughout the entire output domain. In 
other words, under these constrained functional forms, the existence of 
U-shaped average cost curves is ruled out a priori. 
In this paper, a translog cost function is utilized to analyze the 
cost-output relationships and production technology of the National 
Agricultural Development Bank and a large private bank in Honduras. 
Emphasis is placed on the measurement of costs of financial inter-
mediation. This cost function approach also allows the measurement of 
scale economies and the assessment of cost complementarities (economies 
of scope) in the provision of banking services. In addition, the 
effects that financial regulations have on the cost~ o( intermediation 
are analyzed. 
The translog functional form has been used in a number of recent 
studies of scale economies and economies of scope in banking.~ The 
main advantage of this functional form is its flexibility with respect 
to the characteristics of the underlying technology. Many assumptions 
i.nposed by other functional forms, such as homogeneity or unitary 
elasticity of factor-substitution, become testable hypotheses under the 
translog specification. The use of this functional form is specially 
3f Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey; Benston, Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey; 
Murray and White. 
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pertinent in multi-output production, as is the case of financial insti-
tutions producing at least two different outputs, loans and deposit 
services, in varying proportions.!/ 
The following section presents the model utilized in this paper and 
its main properties. The introduction of regulation indicators in the 
cost function is discussed in Section 3. Data and estimation procedures 
are described in Section 4. Results are presented in Sections 5 through 
8. The final section summarizes the main findings of the study. 
2. A Translog Cost Function 
Cost minimization subject to a production constraint yields a cost 
function that depends on output levels and factor prices. In the two-
output, two-input case, this implicit function can be written as: 
where, qi = quantity of ith output 
q1 : loans, q2 : deposits 
pj price of jth input 
(1) 
p1 : salaries and wages, Pz : price of capital services. 
The translog cost function is essentially a second-order approxima-
tion to an arbitrary cost function. It is quadratic in the logarithms 
of output quantities and input prices, and linear in the parameters. 
For two outputs and two inputs, the translog function is written as 
follows: 
17 For a more detailed characterization of the translog function see 
Binswanger; Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau; Ray. 
lnC 
+ n lnq lnp • 
22 2 2 
4 
The cost-share equatim~s f.or the two factor inputs derive from 
equation (2) as: 
j,h = 1,2, 
i = 1,2, 
where S j denotes t 1u; cost share of factor j, 
p.x. 2lnC 
sJ = ....J....J.. = - • c olnp. 
J 
Cost function (2) should be homogenous of degree one in input 
( 2) 
(3) 
prices. This condition imposes a set of restrictions on the parameters 
of equation (2) that is also consistent with the requirement th~t the 
sum of the cost shares (3) must equal one: 
:/j = 1, zjojh = o, t:nij = o, j,h = 1,2, i = 1,2. 
Several properties of the cost structure and the underlying produc-
tion function can be investigated using the translog cost function 
defined in equation (2). These properties are summartzed below. 
Economies of Scale 
Overall economies of scale, ES, are defined as the percentage 
change in cost when all outputs increase by a common factor, A. In 
equation (2), scale economies are measured as: 
8lnC 81nC ES=-+-Olnq1 Cllnq2 ' 
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i.e., ES = a 1 + a 2 + Y11lnq1 + y 221nq2 + y 12 (lnq1 + lnq 2) + 
+ (nll + n21) lnpl + (nl2 + n22) lnp2. 
Note that scale economies are a function of the output levels, 
q1 and q2, therefore the ES measure is not invariant to scale and is 
(4) 
dependent on the output mix. If ES is less than 1, there are economies 
of scale since costs in.:.rease proportionately less than output. Values 
of ES equal to or greater than 1 imply constant returns or diseconomies 
of scale t"P<;;p(~ctively. Partial economies of scale, ES1 , and marginal 
costs of each output, MCi' can be computed from equation (2) as: 
ES. 
~ 
MC. 
1. 
olnC 
= " 1 , and o nq1 
c. 
~ 
=-(B. +Y .. lnql +Yiklnqk)' qi L 1..1 (5) 
where, Ci is the proportion of total costs C attributed to output i. It 
is computed as Ci = giC, where gi = (ESi/ES) is the output-
cost-share, evaluated at the specific levels of both outputs 
4/ 
and all other variables involved in the cost function,-
B =a. + L: .ni.lnp. 
i i J J J 
Cost ~3mplementarities (Eco~~~~~~?! Scope) 
Cost complementat:'ities exist in multi-output production when the 
marginal cost of producing one output declines with increases in produc-
tion of another output, 51 i.e., cost complementarity exist if: 
4/ See Cuevas for a discussion of the cost-attribution problem when 
there is joint production. 
~Murray and White refer to this relationship as "economies of scope". 
However, Benston, Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey give a more strict 
definition for the concept of economies of scope. See also Panzar 
and Willig (1981). 
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This condition can be expressed in terms of the logarithms of the 
variables as: 
(6) 
Since C, qi, qk are all positive, the sign of this second deriva-
tive is determined by the expression in parenthesis. Murray and White 
indicate that in terms of the parameters of the cost function, a 
necessary condition for the existence of cost complementarity between 
loans and deposits is: 
(7) 
Elasticity of Substitution and Elasticities of Input Demand 
Uzawa has shown that the Allen partial elasticity of substitution 
between factors of production, ojh' can be written in terms of the 
(dual) cost function as: 
2 
= ( 3 lnC I a lnC ~ ) 
a jh 3 P l Pk a P j a Ph + 1 • (8) 
This expression can be transformed and expressed in terms of the parame-
ters of the translog cost function (2) and the factor shares (S.), so 
J 
that the Allen partial elasticities of substitution can be computed as: 
2 
ojh = (o.h + S.Sh)/S.Sh, o •• = (6 .. + S.(S.- 1))/S., 
J J J JJ JJ J J J 
j,h = 1,2 • 
In addition, the price elasticities of demand for inputs, ejh' can be 
obtained using the estimated values of crij and the factor shares (see 
Binswanger). 
(9) 
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e =o S e =o S jj jj j ' jh jh h j,h = 1,2 • (10) 
It is clear from (9) that if all ojh = O, then the elasticities of 
substitution are independent of factor prlces, <md equal to one for 
3. Effects of Regulation 
Regulation-related variables are introduced in the cost function 
(2) by assuming that the total demand for every factor of production Xi, 
can be decomposed into two parts: (a) Xil' which corresponds to the 
level of xi consistent with an unregulated enviroruJ.ent; and (b), x12 , an 
additional quantity or a differential skill that is required by existing 
regulations. Examples of these are additional personnel or special 
mechanisms devised to provide customer services that compensate for 
deposit-rate ceilings, and teams hired and trained to dP-.-tl with specific 
project funds and clientele. Also, additional accounting and record-
keeping personnel beco•ne necessary to comply with the reporting require-
ments of special credit programs. Finally, in the case of public 
l@.nding institutions there are usually expanded personnel costs of 
featherbedded employment within the institution and additional workload 
(i.e. costs) of the existing staff associated with servicing political-
patronage clients. The two most important financial regulations in 
Honduras are briefly discussed below. 
Interest-Rate Ceilings 
Interest-rate regulations include ceilings on deposit rates and 
restrictions on lending rates. Restrictions on the level of deposit 
rate create costs of regulation-avoidance in order to compete for 
8 
deposit mobilization. Therefore, an increase in the real deposit-rate 
should induce the substitution of explicit interest for implicit premia 
to depositors, thus decreasing the administrative costs of mobilizing 
deposits. Constraints on the interest rates that can be charged on 
loans generate costs of implementing loan procedures that allow lenders 
to discriminate among borrowers. The higher the ceiling on the lending 
rate, the more flexible and less constrained are these lending opera-
tions. Again, explicit interest charges can take the place of implicit 
charges, and lenders' costs can be reduced through the adoption of less-
complicated loan procedures. This effect will not only reduce lenders' 
costs but will also benefit borrowers since transaction costs associated 
with borrowing will be reduced as well. 
Proxy variables for the effects of interest-rate regulations are 
the ex-post real deposit rate (d- p), and the ex-post real lending rate 
(~ - p), where d is the statutory deposit rate, e is the interest-rate 
ceiling on loans, and p is the rate of inflation. The relevant 
expression that will be included in the cost function can be written as: 
A 1 (d-p) +A 2(2--p) (11) 
. 
where, d, p, and ~ have been defined above. The foregoing discussion 
about the effects of interest-rate regulations indicates that the signs 
of A1 and >-. 2 should be negative. 
Loan Targeting and Special Credit Projects 
The most important financial intermediary dealing with targeted 
funds and special credit projects in Honduras throughout the period con-
sidered in this study (1971-1982) has been the National Agricultural 
9 
Development Bank (BANADESA). Only recently have some private banks par-
ticipated in externally-funded projects sponsored by the World Bank, and 
to a lesser extent by the u.s. Agency for Internattonal Development 
(USAID). Therefore, the analysis of the effects of loan-targeting on 
intermediation costs concentrates on the development bank. 
Targeted funds and special credit projects have a direct effect on 
lenders' costs due to the additional accounting and record-keeping per-
sonnel and materials necessary to comply with the reporting requirements 
of these programs. Typical sonrees of targeted funds in Honduras are 
the central bank, and donor agencies. Central-bank funds correspond 
mainly to crop-specific lines of credit designed to provide short-term 
financing to small and medium-size farms. Foreign funds usually come in 
the form of special projects targeted to specific activities, and tend 
to include a larger proportton of long-term loans. In what follows, the 
term "external funds" will be used to refer to both central-bank and 
foreign funds. The other, non-targeted, source of funds for BA~A.DESA 
are demand, savings and time deposits from public-sector institutions, 
and from the public at large. 
It is hypothesized that the effect of targeted funds on costs in 
the development bank includes a "ratchet" effect. That is, the 
increased level of costs growing out of a new credit project contracted 
by the bank does not decline to the previously existing cost level once 
the loan funds have been disbursed to the ultimate borrowers. 
Additional resources are employed or purchased at the beginning of the 
project in order to comply with the project's targeting requirements, 
10 
but these resources are not laid-off or sold once the funds are dis-
bursed. The cost furtction will thus incorporate a set of variables that 
capture the effect of targeted funds under this "ratchet" effect 
hypoth~~ts. Three indicator variableq (S1,1=1,2,3) are defined to 
account for the effect of the three different sources of funds: depo-
sits, central bank, and foreign funds. In order to capture the 
influence of targeted funds under the "ratchet" effect hypothesis, St's 
are defined so that Si > 0 if the value of funds coming from source 1 
has increased over the level observed tn the previous year, otherwise 
s1 = 0. Specifically, the value of s1 in year t (S1t) will follow a 
three-point distribution, such that: 
s1 t = o, if nit ~ o 
Sit = l, if 0 < 8it ~ (l/ 2) ~itm 
sit 2, if (l/ 2) ~itm <~it ~~itm' 
where, ~tt stands for the difference between the amount of funds coming 
from source i in year t, and the amount of these funds in 
year t-1, 
8itrn is the maximum value of this difference observed over the 
period covered by the data (1971-1982). 
A combined variable, s23 is similarly defined to account for the 
effect of all external funds combined (central-bank and foreign funds 
together). The "ratchet effect" hypothesis implies that a positive sign 
is expected in the coefficients of the s1 variables that capture the 
effects of targeted funds, i.e., central-bank and foreign funds. The 
estimation will consider the possthtlity that these effects may be 
lagged, particularly for foreign-donor funds, since this source of 
11 
funding is often in the form of special projects with delayed period of 
disbursement and expenditures. Consequently, e~ternal funds combined, 
and foreign funds alone ~re also specified with a one-year lag, to cap-
ture the lagged effect increases in these sources of funds are likely to 
have on costs. 
Summarizing, the set of indicator qariables that will enter the 
cost function to address the issue of loan-targetlng can be written as: 
' 
or alternatively: 
where, si's have been defined above and w1's are the corresponding 
parameters. 
The variables s 2 and s 23 are also included with a one-year lag in 
various regressions. 
4. Data and Estimation 
(12) 
The estimation of the cost function draws upon two separate data 
sets. The first data base corresponds to 28 branches of the National 
Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA) over the 12-year period 1971 
through 1982. This bank is referred as the "development bank". The 
second data set was obtained from the largest private commercial bank of 
the country (Banco Atlantida), that will be referred to as the "private 
bank". This bank has a network of over 50 agencies and offices 
throughout the collntry, that is organized into 16 main branches with 
independent accounting records. The same 12-year period (1971-82) is 
covered by this data set. Data were gathered throllgh the Economic 
Studies departments of both banks, and in many cases directly from the 
12 
branches. Financial-sector and national-income variables were recorded 
from Central Bank publications. 
All variables have been expressed in real terms (lempiras of 1966) 
using the country's implicit GDP deflator. Variable definitions are 
briefly outlined below. 
(a) Costs: total non-financial operating expenses, net of depreciation 
and provisions for bad debt. The sources of these data in both banks 
were the revenue-expenditure statements of the branches, produced by the 
accounting divisions. 
(b) Outputs: total value of loans (q1), and total amount of deposit 
balances (q2). The deflnition of bank output har:; bt~•=n a matter of 
controversy in the recent literature.2/ Alternative definitions to the 
one utilized here are: (i) the number of loans, and th·:> ruuuber of depo-
sit accounts (as separate outputs), and (ii) an index of aggregate out-
put including loans and deposits. Preliminary regressions on the data 
showed that the definition of value of loans, and deposit balances as 
separate outputs provided consistently better fits than any of the 
alternative definitions. This definition was therefore chosen on this 
basis. 
(c) Factor Prices. Two factors are considered here: labor, and capital 
goods. The price of labor services (p1) is measured as total personnel 
costs including benefits and social security payments divided by the 
total number of employees. A unit price of capital services (p 2) is 
proxied by the ratio of depreciation plus rents paid over the total 
value of loans plus deposit balances. This proxy was found positively 
§.! See Cuevas for a discussion of these definitions. 
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(and significantly) correlated with the implicit deflator of gross 
domestic capital formation in the national accounts. A posteriori sup-
port for this proxy selection is the fact that the factor-price homoge-
neity condition is met in all (unrestricted) r"l~tirnations of the cost 
function. 
(d) Loan Size (LS) and Deposit Si?.e (US). These variables are included 
in the model to account for the heterogeneity of loans and deposit tran-
sactions. They are included in the co~t fun~tlon (2) in interactive 
form with the output levels: 
e1 tnq1lnLS + e2lnq2tnDS. 
In this way, both the scale-economies indicator and the marginal costs 
of production become dependent on the average size of loans and depo-
sits. Since the number of loans was not available in the private bank, 
loan size could not be computed for this bank. 
(e) Real deposit-rate and real lending-rate. The nominal deposit rate 
(d) was calculated as the arithmetic mean of all deposit-rate ceilings 
established by the central bank. The real deposit rate is obtained by 
substracting the inflation rate p from the nominal deposit rate. The 
real lending rate is proxied substracting the inflation rate from the 
overall c~~tling established for the nominal interest rate on loans, !1.. 
The rate of inflation is calculated as the 1?.-month variation in the 
implicit GDP deflator. 
Estimation of the translog cost functl.on (2) was undertaken inde-
pend<':'ntly for the two banks, both as a single equation (by OLS), and as 
a cost system with the cost-share equations (3). Since cost shares must 
add to l, one of these equations is redundant and therefore is dropped 
14 
from the system. The remaining equations in the system, the cost func-
tion and the labor-share equation, are seemingly unrelated and the esti-
mation of this t~o-equation system utilizes a generalized-least-squares 
procedure. Joint estimation of the cost system should improve the efft-
ciency of the parameter estimates. However, Benston, Hanweck and 
Humphrey argue that these ~-li.ns in efficiency are relatively small and 
undert'Otke thei.r estimations using OLS on the cost fun.·L i.o11 above. As 
will be shown later, aside from efficiency gains, there may be important 
differences in the magnitude of the estimated parameters resulting from 
different estimation procedures. As a consequence, the scale-economies 
measure (and other parameters) will differ depending on the estimation 
technique. 
('-5~ Intermediation Costs: Summary of Findings and Contrasts 
// 
A summary of some of the estimated costs of intermediation of the 
development bank and the private bank is shown in table 1. Thes~ 
results are based on the cost-system estimates reported in the Appendix, 
tables A.l and A.2. The gains in efficiency due to the adoption of a 
system-estimation procedure were very clec~.r t11 the development bank. 
However, they appeared less important in the private bank where multi-
collinearity was ver.y htgh. Rows 1 and 2 of table 1 indicate the 
distribution of total intermediation costs in each bank between lending 
costs (row 1), and costs of mobilizing deposits (row 2). Rows 3 and 4 
show the average and marginal costs of lending on a per-lempira basis, 
while rows 5 and 6 report the corresponding average and marginal costs 
figures for the costs of deposit mobilization. Finally, overall 
15 
Table 1. Lender's Intermediation Costs: Lending Costs and 
Costs of Mobili7.i.ng Deposits. Summary of Findl.rtgs 
for the Development Bank and the Private Bank. 
Cost Concept 
1. Share of Lending Costs in 
Total Intermediation Costs 
2. Share of Deposit-Mobilization 
Costs in Total Intermediation 
Costs 
Costs of Lending 
3. Average Costs 
4. Marginal Costs 
Costs of Mobilizing Dep~~~~~ 
5. Average Costs 
6. Marginal Costs 
Overall Lender's 
Intermedi.atlon Costs!/ 
7. Average Costs 
8. Marginal Costs 
Development 
Bank 
(%) 
71.1 
28.9 
10.02 
7.64 
8.78 
2. 72 
18.80 
10.36 
Private 
Bank 
(%) 
28.3 
71.7 
3.39 
1.69 
5.33 
8.72 
8.40 
Source: Results of cost-Kyste~ estimations, table A.l (model 2) 
and table A.2 (model 2) in the Appendix, evaluated at 
geometric means of the variables in the models. 
a/ Lending Costs + Costs of Deposit Mobilization 
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inte~mediation costs (lending co~ts plus deposit-mobilization costs) are 
reported in rows 7 and 8 of table 1. 
The first import~nt contrast between the two banks is ~hown in rows 
1 and 2 of table 1. Over 70% of the development-bank's costs of inter-
mediation correspond to lending activities, whereas only 29% of its 
costs are attributed to the administration of deposit accounts. The 
opposit~ ts true for the private bank, where only 28% of tlu .. costs are 
associated wtth lending, while 72% of the bank's total intermediation 
costs are related to deposit mobilization. 't'his acute contrast reflects 
the development-bank's greater reliance on foreign funds and special 
rediscount lines from the central bank, as compared to the private bank 
which relies more heavily upon financial resources mobilized from the 
general public. 
Over the period under analysis (1971-1982), an average of 51% of 
the loan-po~tfolio of the development bank was funded through foreign 
funds or central-bank rediscount linec;. Further1nort->, these external 
(non-deposit) sources of funds have grown in relative importance with 
respect to the loan-portfolio from a 44%-average tn the period 1971-1974 
to a 57%-average in the period 1979-1982. Consequently, the proportion 
of the total value of new loans funded through deposit mobilization 
decreased from an average of 56% in the period 1971-1974, to a 
43%-average in the last four years of the series. On the other hand, 
the private bank has relied primarily upon deposits mobilized from the 
general public to finance its loan portfolio. This bank's access to 
rediscount lines at the centrol bank has been limited, ancl only recently 
has it engaged in foreign-funded special credit projects. In 1981, a 
17 
representative year according to bank officials, 91% of the loan port-
folio was funded with own deposits, almost 7% came from cc•ltr·al-bank 
rediscount funds, and a little over 1% from foreign funds (primarily 
World Bank projects). This sharp contrast in the composition of the 
banks' liabilities has a counterpart in the allocation of real resources 
in each bank, that is reflected in the participation of lending and 
deposit activities in toLal intemediation costs. 
Costs of lending show a second striking contrast between the two 
banks. The estimated average costs of lending are 10% for the develop-
ment bank, three times as high as those estimated for the private bank 
(3.39%). The marginal costs of lending are 4.5 times larger in the 
development bank (7.6%) than in the private bank (1.7%). This is again 
reflecting the differences in the sources of funds with which the banks 
operate. The greater reliance on external funds by the development bank 
implie5 the acceptance of loan-targets imposed by foreign donors, inter-
national lenders, and/or the government. These targets typically imply 
servicing a more risky and numerous clientele, and a high incidence of 
relatively small loans. Also, targeted funds are accompanied by moni-
toring, supervision, and reporting requirements that force the institu-
tion to maintain a more centralized operation, and a heavier incidence 
of supervisory and record-keeping resources, than would be the case in 
the absence of these targeting requirements. 
It is important to note that the cost estimates reported in table 1 
do not include provisions for bad debts, thus representing a lower-bound 
estimate for the operational spread that these institutions would 
require in order not to suffer operational losses. In this sense, the 
18 
results obtained for the development bank are particularly striking, 
especially when comparing these results wi.th the m-~rt; t1B contemplated in 
credit projects funded by external agencies or the central bank. These 
funding sources usually allow only 3 to 4 percentage points to cover the 
administrative costs associated with the on-lending of their funds. 
Thus, to operate with these special lines of credit the development bank 
experiences an operational loss of over 6%, assuming that all loans are 
fully repaid. 
The foregoing results highlight the existence of a policy incon-
sistency, in the sense that external donors and/or the government impose 
on the development bank costly loan-targets without appropriate support 
to service these target-groups. The costs of servicing a more risky, 
more numerous, and more costly clientele, for which the institution is 
reimbursed only at <t margin of 3 or 4 percentage points, seriously 
compromise the financial viability of the institution. It is 
interesting to note that the usual 3-4% margin is closer to the average 
lending costs observed in efficient private commercial banks like the 
one under study here, than to the average lending costs observed in the 
development bank. However, as it has been documented elsewhere, the 
average cost of lending for the private bank increases substantially 
when dealing with foreign-funded credit projects (Graham and Cuevas). 
The average cost of agricultural loans made by the private bank with 
World Bank funds has been estimated c1t 8.4% ignoring default risks, a 
figure that exceeds by far the 4%-spread allowed in Lht->-.:e credit pro-
jects for loan-administration costs. 
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The average costs of mobilizing deposits are also higher in the 
development bank as compared to the private bank (row 5 in table 1). 
However, margindl cnCJts of deposit-mobilization show the opposite pat-
tern, they are lower in the development bank than in the private bank 
(row 6 in table 1). Note also that the private bank has gone beyond the 
minimum average cost level in its deposit activity, since the marginal 
costs of deposit-mobilization appears ~igher than the corresponding 
average cost. That ls, this bank has reached a point of decreasing 
returns to further expansions of the deposit~obilization activity, 
unless this expansion relies upon increasingly large average deposit-
balances (see effects of deposit-size on the bank's costs in table A.2). 
At the other extreme, the development bank is operating on the steep-
dOWll~ard-sloping section of a hypothetical average-cost curve for 
deposit-mobilization, considering the large difference between average 
costs and marginal costs observed in table 1. This difference between 
average costs and marginal costs should be attributed primarily to 
under-utilized fixed or quasi-fixed resources in the structure of the 
bank. 
Overall, intermediation costs are higher tn the development bank 
than in the private bank (rows 7 and 8 in table ~0~. However, this dif-
ference is more important in terms of the total average costs of opera-
tion than it is in te-rms of the marginal costs of interm~'> li -::1tion. The 
relationship between the levels of average costs and marginal costs in 
the development bank reflects under-utilization of existing resources, 
whereas the private bank appears very clo-;.,. to lts minimum-c<).:;t level of 
activity (marginal cost almost equals average cost). Marginal costs of 
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intermediation in the development bank are only two percentage points 
higher than in the private bank, according to the estimates reported in 
table 10. This result indicates that the differences in efficiency are 
not too substantial between the two b~nks. However, an important impli-
cation is that marginal-cost pricing would imply large operational 
losses for the development bank, whereas in the case of the private bank 
it would represent an almost break-even situation. From a policy-making 
point of view, if operational margins were administered so that the 
development bank could cover its marginal costs of intermediation, this 
bank would still experience substantial tosses, since its average C<)-;tg 
exceed by far lts marginal costs. Under such a policy however, the pri-
vate bank would earn a profit since its average costR are tower than the 
marginal costs of the development bRnk. 
5.2. Economies of Scale, Cost Complementarities, and 
Factor Substitution 
Economies of Scale 
The importance of output definition, functional form, and the pro-
cedure utilized to estimate the parameters of the cost function, in 
terms of the resulting scale-economies indicators, is thoroughly 
discussed in Cuevas. In the two banks, the results obtained with the 
pref,!Ct"ed estintation approaches, system estimation of translog cost 
functions, generate estimates of economies of scale that are not signi-
ficantly different from one. The important contrast however, is that in 
the development bank the point estimate of economies of scale ts close 
to one (1.07), whereas in the prtvate bank this point estimate is con-
siderab1y greater than one (1.59). In the former case, a 10%-increase 
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in the production of both outputs (loans and deposits) will generate a 
10.7%-increase in total administrative costs of the development bank. 
In the private bank, the same 10%-increase in both outputs will create 
an increase in total administrative costs of 15.9%. 
A more direct way of porl.raying the effects of scale and output-mix 
on the values of economies-of-scale measures is computing these values 
for branches of different sizes in each bank. This exercise is sum-
marized in table 2, that shows the values of partL:tl economies of scale 
(percentage change in costs with a 1% change in~ output), and overall 
economies of scale (change in costs as ;~ result of a change in the pro-
duction of both outputs), for the two banks. Different (real-life) 
branch-size cases have been selected in both banks, in order to assess 
the main similarities and contrasts between banks and branch-sizes. 
Partial and overall economies of scale computed at the sample means of 
each bank are also reported in table 2. 
A first contrast between the two banks is found in the values of 
the overall scale-econo1nles indicators (rows 3 and 6 in table 2). The 
magnitudes of tht.~ estimated indicat·or-, for the two hr.-tnch-sizes of the 
development bank denote the existence of a U-shaped overall average-cost 
"curve" (indeed a cost-surface), with the small branch lying on the 
downward sloping portion of this "curve", and the large branch located 
on the upward sloping section of this surface. The results obtained for 
the private bank however, indicate that even the small branch would be 
experiencing "diseconomies" associated with overall output expansion. A 
representation of the private bank's average cost would be a surface 
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Table 2. Estimated Values of Partial and Overall Economies of Scale 
(ES), at th·~ Sample Means and at Different Branch-Sizes. 
Development Bank and Private Bank 
Bank, Economies-of-Scale 
Measure (ES) 
Development Ban~~/ 
Partial ES (olnC/olnq1 ) 
(1) ESt, Loans 
(2) Es 2 , Deposits 
(3) Overall ES (L 1atnC/olnq1) 
Private BaniJY 
Partial ES (olnC/3lnqi) 
(4) ESt, Loans 
(5) Es 2 , Deposits 
(6) Overall ES (~ 1olnC/3lnq1 ) 
Level of Evaluation 
0.77 0.66 1.14 
0.31 0.30 0.40 
1.08 0.96 1.54 
0.39 0.22 0.67 
1.20 1.05 1.42 
1.59 2.09 
!1 Computed from table A.3 (model 2) in the Appendix. Branch-size cases 
selected on the basis of loan activity, 1982. 
~ Computed from table A.4 (model 2) in the Appendix. Branch-size cases 
selected on the basis of loan and deposit activity, 1982. 
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with positive slopes for all movements that imply proportional expan-
sions of both outputs. 
The expression "overall expansion" needs to be underlined in the 
foregoing discussion since~ as is evident from table 2, there exist 
substantial differences in the separate cost-effects of the expansion of 
different outputs. Furthermore, these differential effects of output 
expansions vary across banks. For the development bank, there exist 
substantial economies of scale to the expansion of deposit-mobilization 
activities. The partial scale-economies value of 0.31 computed at the 
sample mean (row 2, column 1 in table 13) indicates that a 10%-increase 
in deposit balances mobilized by the bank generates only a 3.1%-increas~ 
tn administrative costs. On the other hand, the lending activities of 
this development bank are approaching constant returns-to-scale for the 
average-branch caselJ, and display diseconomies of scale in branches 
with large amounts of funds lent (row 1, column 3). The opposite pat-
tern is observed for the private bank in table 2. This bank's lending 
is the activity that shows cost-advantages as compared to deposit mobi-
lization. In all cases, an expansion in the private bank's lending of 
10% would generate small-to-moderate increases in administrative costs, 
depending on the branch size (2.2% in the small branch, to 6.7% in the 
large branch). In contrast, the same expansion in the private bank's 
deposit-mobilization activity would create a cost increase between 10.5% 
(small branch) and 14.2% (large branch). 
The general conclusion of the foregoing analysis is that the two 
banks could benefit from "economies of scale" by engaging in unbalanced 
7/ i.e., a hypothetical branch that could be descdbed by the sample 
means of all variables. 
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output-expansion. In brief, each bank should expand relatively more the 
activity with the lowest value of the partial scale-economies measure, 
i.e., the output whose expansion generates the smallest cost increase. 
Expansion strategies for the development bank should emphasize deposit 
mobilization over lending activities. On the other hand, the private 
bank's expansion strategies should be biased towards lending operations. 
With deposit-mobilization expanding at a slower pace than lending, the 
overall (weighted) economies-of-scale indicator for this bank should 
approach unity. 
Cost Complementarities (Economies of Scope), and Elasticities 
of Factor Substitution and Factor Demand 
Several parameters associated with the underlying technology of 
production are derived from the estimated parameters of the cost func-
tion. The relationships that allow the derivation of these results were 
discussed in section 2. Table 3 reports these results for the two banks 
under study. The necessary condition for the existence of cost-
complementarities indicated by Murray and White is met in the two banks 
(row 1 in the table). In addition to the satisfaction of this necessary 
condition for cost complementarity, no further conclusions can be 
derived from the numerical values reported in table 3, row 1, since 
there are no specific units associated with these estimated parameters. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, these results indicate that, for the 
two banks, joint production of loans and deposits offers cost-advantages 
as compared to specialized single-output activity. This argues against 
the widespread "development" strategy of creating specialized lending 
institutions with no deposit-mobilization functions. Without 
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Table 3. Cost Complementarities in Production (Economies of Scope), 
Elasticities of Factor Substitution, and Price-Elasticities 
of 'Demand for Factors of Production, 'Derived from 
Cost-Function Estimates. Development Bank and Private Bank. 
Estimated Parameters 
" ~ 1. Cost Complementarities, () 12 + u1a 2) 
2. Elasticity of Factor-Substitatlon 
between Labor and Capital, o12 
3. Price-Elasticities of 'Demand for 
Factors of Production, e1 j 
ell (demand for labor, pr:ice of 
el2 (demand for labor, price of 
e22 (demand for capital, price 
e21 (demand for capital, price 
labor) 
capital) 
of capital) 
of labor) 
Development 
Bank: a/ 
-o.4393 
0.6328 
-0.4493 
0.4493 
-0.1835 
0.1835 
!f Computed from cost-system estimates, table A.l, model 2. 
b/ Computed from cost-system estimates, table A.2, model 2. 
Private 
Bank.£/ 
-0.8651 
1.2419 
-0.8693 
0.8693 
-0.3726 
0.3726 
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necessarily altering their initial goals and objectives, these institu-
tions would be better off in terms of costs and financial liability with 
the provision of multiple services to their clientele. 
The elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, ''12' com-
puted using the estimated parameters of the cost function and reported 
in table 3 (row 2) appear relatively low for the development bank, even 
though there are no appropriate points of reference in the literature 
revised. The result obtained for the private bank (v 12=1.24) is almost 
twice as high as the value reported for the development bank (c 12=0.63). 
For comparison, the values reported by Murray and White for British 
A 
Columbia credit unions (v 12=1.74) are even higher than the elasticity 
of substitution found here for the private bank. However, their results 
imply price-elasticities of demand for factors of production of a magni-
tude similar to those calculated here in the case of the private bank. 
In general, the private bank shows a higher value of the elasticity 
of substitution between factors of production, and factor demands more 
price-elastic than the development bank. These results denote a greater 
flexibility of the private bank in the allocation of productive resour-
ces, and a larger response to factor-market signals, as compared to the 
development bank. As expected, in both cases the demand for labor ser-
vices shows a higher price-elasticity than the demand for services of 
capital goods. Overall, the results presented in table 3 reflect a 
more rigid structure of operations in the development bank, and a less 
important role of market signals in this bank's resource allocation, as 
compared to the private bank. As will be discussed later at greater 
length, the management of a development bank operates in an environment 
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subject to pressures and constraints that at times induces decisions 
independent of market considerations. 
7. Interest-Rate Regulations and Lenders' Intenuediation Costs 
In this section, the effects of interest-rate regulations on the 
banks' administrative costs are analyzed, inclurllng in each bank's func-
tion the real deposit-rate and the real lending-rate as proxies for the 
interest-rate restrictions imposed on financial intermediaries. It is 
useful to recall her..: the expression that includes these two 
proxy-variables: 
>. 1(d- p) + >. 2(9- - p) 
where, d is the nominal deposit-rate, 
R. is the nominal ceiling on the lending rate, 
p is the inflation rate. 
(llr) 
Table 4 summari?.es the results obtained in the estimation of the 
effects of interest-rate regulations on bank's nor1-financial costs. For 
the two banks (panels A and B), rows 1 and 2 indicate the estimated 
coefficients obtained including in the cost function the real deposit-
rate (row 1), .2!. the real lending-rate celling (row 2). Row 3 of the 
two panels in table 4 show the estimated parameters obtained when tht:> 
r,_,al deposit-rate and the re.<il lending-rate ceiling are specified in the 
cost function. 
In general, the results presented in table 4 indicate that there is 
an inverse relationship between the levels of real inter~st-rates and 
the costs of financial intermediation. Increases in the levels of the 
real deposit-rate or the real lending-rate will generate reductions in 
Table 4. Effects of Interest-Rate Regulations on Lenders' Intermediation Costs: Estimated 
Parameters of the Real-Deposit Rate, and the Real Lending-Rate in Different 
Equations. Cost-system Estimates for the Develop;uent Bank and the Private R-wk ... :~/ 
Parame-t-er, Variable 
>.. 1 , (d- p): >.. 2 , (t - p): 
real real 
deposit-cate lending-rate 
ceiling ceili~~-~-
Estimate Estimate 
(asymptotic (asymptotic 
Bank (model) t-ratio) t-ratio) 
-m-·. ·-- (2) 
A. Development bank 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
B. Private bank 
(1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
-0.0383 
('-8.48)* 
0.0345 
(4.33)* 
-0.0214 
(-5.58)* 
-0.0153 
(-1.80) 
-0.0263 
(-9.71)* 
-0.0584 
(-10.32)* 
-0.0008 ( -o. 26) 
-0.0052 
(-0.81) 
Weighted 
R-square 
of the 
cost-system 
0) 
0.78 
0.78 
0.83 
0.97 
0.95 
0.97 
F-test of 
Joint Null 
Hypothesis: 
>.. 1 = O, >.. 2 = 0 
{T) 
68 .93* 
15.16* 
t-test 
of Null 
Hypothesis: 
>.. 1 +>-z=O 
cs-) 
-4.84* 
-4.97* 
a/ Other parameters of the cost function not reported. See basic specifications in t~ble ~.3 
(development bank) and table A.4 (private bank), in the Appendix. 
* : significant at 0.01 level 
t : significant at 0.05 level 
N 
co 
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total intermediation costs of the banks. On the other hand, interest-
rate restrictions that reduce the levels of the real deposit or lending 
rates will have cost-increasing effects on the financial intermediaries. 
For the development bank, panel A in table 4, the real deposit-rate 
and the real lending-rate ceiling show negative and statistically signi-
ficant coefficients when included in separate regressions (rows 1 and 
2). The sign of the real deposit-rate becomes positive when this 
variable is included together with the real lending rate (row 3), a 
result that is probably a consequence of the high correlation between 
these real rates. Despite this difficulty, it is pertinent and 
revealing to test for the effect of a simultaneous change in both the 
real deposit-rate and the real lending-rate ceiling, i.e., a change that 
policy-makers could claim is "spread-neutral". This test for the com-
bined effect of changes in the two rates (A 1 + A2) indicate that the net 
effect on the development bank's costs will be of opposite sign and 
significantly different from zero (see column 5). For example, using 
the results reported in row 5 of panel A, the net effect of a one-point 
increase in both the real deposit-rate ceiling and the real lending-rate 
ceiling would be a reduction of 2.4% in total intermediation costs of 
A A 
the ban~/ (A 1 + A2 = -0.024, t-ratio = -4.84). Note that the sign and 
magnitude of the combined effects of simultaneous changes in deposit and 
lending rates (Al + A2) is not too different from the individual effects 
of each of these variables when included in separate equations (rows 1, 
2, and 3). Therefore, it is possible to conclude that changes in the 
real deposit-rate ceiling and the real lending-rate ceiling will bring 
about changes in total intermediation costs of the development bank in 
~ i.e., approximately 0.35 million lempiras In 1982. 
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the opposite direction of 2 to 3% per unit of change in the real 
interest~rate ceilings. 
The results obtained for the private bank (panel B in table 4) are 
similar to the findings discussed above for the development bank. In 
the private bank, the estimated parameters for the real deposit-rate 
ceilings show negative signs and are statistically significant in the 
two equations including this variable (rows 1 and 3, column 1). The 
test performed for the combined effect of simultaneous changes in the 
real deposit-rate ceiling and the real lending-rate ceiling (row 3, 
column 5) indicates that this combined effect has a negative sign and is 
significantly different from zero (A 1 + A2 = -0.0205, t-ratio = -4.97). 
This result is similar to that obtained in the same test performed for 
the development bank. A simultaneous increase in both the real deposit-
rate ceiling and the real lending-rate ceiling of one percentage point 
will generate a 2.05%-decrease in total intermediation costs of the 
private bank.~/ 
The general conclusion that derives from the foregoing analysis is 
that interest-rate regulations are an important determinant of non-
financial intermediation costs in the financial institutions under 
study. According to these results, interest-rate restrictions that 
translate into reductions in the real ceilings imposed on deposit and 
lending rates generate significant cost increases to the financial 
intermediaries. It is important to note that the cost increases borne 
by lenders estimated in this section are only a lower-bound estimate of 
the total cost-effects of interest-rate restrictions. Part of these 
total cost-effects are passed-on by the financial intermediaries 
2J i.e., about 0.8 million lempiras in 1982. 
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primarily to borrowers, under the form of transaction costs associated 
with loan procedures established by lenders.lO/ 
8. Loan-Targeting and Lenders' Intermediation Costs in the 
Development Bank 
This section discusses the effects of loan-targeting on the inter-
mediation costs of the development bank. The mechanisms through which 
targeted funds create additional costs for the financial intermediaries, 
as well as the methodological approach adopted for this analysis, have 
been described in previous sections. Targeted funds are identified as 
funds obtained from central-bank rediscount lines, or from foreign 
donors. The term .. external funds" is utilized here to refer to both 
central-bank and foreign funds combined. Non-targeted funds are demand, 
savings, and time deposits captured from public institutions and from 
the general public. 
An analysis of the relationships between the sources of funds and 
portfolio composition may be summarized as follows: (a) the growing 
share of external sources of funds (largely directed towards 
agriculture) throughout the period 1971-82 has not been reflected in a 
significant change in the relative role of agricultural loans in the 
portfolio. The fungibility of finance is at work here, with external 
funds substituting for own-deposit funds that have been transferred from 
agricultural to non-agricultural loans. (b) The increased share of 
external funds may have induced the re-allocation of non-targeted funds 
to increasingly larger-sized loans in the non-agricultural sector. This 
cost-saving adjustment compensates for the increasing costs of handling 
10/ An analysis of borrowing-transaction costs is included in Cuevas. 
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a growing proportion of external funds in the "targeted" portion of the 
loan portfolio. 
The cost-function estimates including expression (12) to capture 
the effects of different sources of funds on intermediation costs are 
presented in table 5. Model 1 in this table includes the indicator 
variable for non-targeted funds (own-deposits, s1), and the lagged com-
bined effect of external funds (central bank and foreign funds). Model 2 
also includes the non-targeted-funds variable, but separates the effect 
of (current-year) central bank funds from those of foreign funds with a 
one-year lag. 
The estimated coefficients for the variable that captures the 
effects of increases in the amount of non-targeted funds (S1 , deposits) 
are not statistically different from zero, with very low asymptotic t-
ratios in both models. Targeted funds show significant cost-increasing 
effects, whether they are included as a combined variable (column 1), or 
as separate effects (column 2). Given the typical features of central-
bank and foreign-funded projects, model 2 is a more appropriate repre-
sentation of these targeting schemes than model 1. The results of model 
2 indicate that increases in central-bank funds will have a contem-
poraneous cost-increasing effect on the development bank (o)z > 0), given 
the short-term nature of the targeted programs funded through rediscount 
lines of the central bank. On the other hand, additional funds origi-
nated in foreign sources, usually targeted to medium-to-long-term acti-
vities with extended periods of disbursement, will exercise a 
cost-increasing effect with a one-year lag (w3 > 0 for S3(t-1)). 
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T~ble 5. Effects of Loan-Targeting on the Intermediation Costs 
of the Development Bank: Estimated Coefficients for 
Different Sources of Funds.~/ 
Source of Funds, Parameter 
~on-targeted funds 
Targeted funds 
w23 , lagged central bank 
and foreign (S23(t-1)) 
(J> 3 , lagged foreign funds 
(S3(t-1)) 
Weighted R-square of the cost system 
F-test of Joint Null Hypothesis: 
!<li = O, all i 
Estimated Coefficients 
in Different Models£/ 
(1) (2) 
0.0056 0.0145 
(0.31) (0.76) 
0.1129 
(4.20)* 
0.0756 
(2.81)* 
0.0525 
(1.94)t 
o. 73 0.74 
3.13t 5.30* 
~/ Cost-system estimation, other parameters of the cost 
function not reported. See basic specification of the 
cost function in table A.3. 
b/ Asymptotic t-ratios in parenthesis. 
* : significant at 0.01 level 
t significant at 0.05 level 
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In summary, these results support the hypothesis that there is a 
lagged, "ratchet"-type effect of targeted funds on the intermediation 
costs of the development bank. Overall intermediation costs are 
increased as a result of additional funding received from external sour-
ces. This effect is more significant in the case of rediscount lines of 
credit coming from the central bank than in the case of foreign-funded 
projects. On the other hand, greater reliance on deposits as a source 
of loan-funds will not affect overall intermediation costs of the deve-
lopment bank. 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
This study has investigated the costs involved in financial inter-
mediation in a small lesser developed economy. Aside from the explicit 
costs of finance, interest rates, all participants in financial markets 
use real resources when performing their roles in financial intermedia-
tion: savings mobilization, lending, and borrowing. The non-interest 
transaction costs borne by financial intermediaries have been the focus 
of this study. The effects of financial regulation on these transaction 
costs were also addressed. Among these, interest-rate regulations and 
selective credit policies emphasizing agricultural credit received major 
attention. 
Financial-intermediaries' cost functions were the basis for 
measuring and analyzing the costs incurred by these institutions. 
Several characteristics of the underlying technology of banks were 
assessed through these cost-function estimates: scale economies, econo-
mies of scope (cost complementarities), elasticities of factor substitu-
tion and factor demand. 
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Banks analyzed were the National Agricultural Development Bank of 
Honduras (BANADESA), and the largest private commercial bank in the 
country. The estimation and analysis of the cost functions of these 
financial institutions were based on branch-level data of the two banks. 
Intermediation Costs 
Estimation of lenders' intermediation costs indicated that these 
costs are considerably higher than is usually assumed. At the same 
time, there were important differences between the costs of deposit-
mobilization and those associated with lending. Also, the findings 
revealed notorious contrasts across institutions (i.e. the development 
bank versus the private bank). All results summarized below are based 
on translogarithmic cost functions, estimated by seemingly unrelated 
regressions (GLS), with bank outputs defined as the value of loans and 
deposit balances. 
For the development bank, over 70 percent of intermediation costs 
corresponded to lending, whereas less than 30 percent were attributed to 
the administration of deposit accounts. The opposite is true for the 
private bank, where only 28 percent of the costs were associated with 
lending, while 72 percent were related to deposit mobilization. This 
acute contrast reflects the development-bank's greater reliance on 
foreign funds and special rediscount lines from the central bank, as 
compared to the private bank which relied more heavily upon financial 
resources mobilized from the general public. 
The average costs of lending in the development bank (10%) were 
almost three times as high as those estimated for the private bank 
(3.4%). The marginal costs of lending were 4.5 times larger in the 
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development bank than in the private bank (7.6% versus 1.7%). This 
again reflects the differences in the sources of funds with which each 
bank operates. The greater reliance on external loan sources by the 
development bank created additional costs of compliance with loan-
targeting requirements imposed by foreign donors or the government. 
These in turn forced the institution to maintain a more centralized 
operation, and a heavier incidence of supervisory and record-keeping 
resources than would have been the case in the absence of these 
targeting requirements. The results obtained for the development bank 
indicate that the usual administrative margins contemplated by foreign 
donors for special credit projects (3 or 4%) are unrealistically low, 
and compromise the financial viability of lending institutions par-
ticipating in these "targeted" programs. 
The average costs of mobilizing deposits were also higher in the 
development bank compared to the private bank (8.8% versus 5.3%). On 
the other hand the marginal costs of deposit-mobilization showed the 
opposite pattern. These were lower in the development bank (2.7%) than 
in the private bank (6.7%). Furthermore, deposit mobilization in the 
private bank had reached a point of decreasing returns. Further expan-
sion of the deposit-mobilization activity in the private bank is an 
unattractive option, unless this expansion relies upon larger-sized 
average deposit balances. In sharp contrast, the results for the deve-
lopment bank highlight the existence of excess capacity unexploited for 
deposit mobilization, i.e. the marginal costs of deposit mobilization 
(2.7%) were well below the average costs (8.8%). 
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Overall, intermediation costs were higher in the development bank 
than in the private bank. However, the difference between the average 
costs was larger than the difference between the marginal costs of 
intermediation. The latter were only two percentage points higher in 
the development bank than in the private bank, thus indicating a similar 
degree of economic efficiency in terms of marginal cost criteria. 
Marginal cost criteria are frequently used as efficient pricing strate-
gies. However, in this case any policy emphasizing marginal cost 
pricing would represent large operational losses for the development 
bank (given its much higher average costs), whereas in the case of the 
private bank this policy would imply an almost break-even situation. 
Evidence on Scale and Scope Economies 
Scale-economies estimates for both banks were not significantly 
different from one, even though the estimated levels (i.e. the elasti-
city of costs to increases in output) were consistently lower in the 
case of the development bank. These results of non-significant scale 
economies were not surprising, considering the small size of financial 
markets in low-income countries. An important finding was the substan-
tial difference in the separate effects of the expansion of different 
outputs on intermediation costs. For the development bank, there were 
important economies of scale to the expansion of deposit-mobilization 
activities, whereas lending activities were approaching constant 
returns-to-scale for the average-branch case. The opposite was found 
for the private bank, where the expansion of lending activities showed 
cost advantages as compared to deposit mobilization. These different 
cost effects of different outputs indicate that both banks could benefit 
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from "economies of scale" by engaging in unbalanced output expansion. 
Expansion strategies for the development bank should emphasize deposit 
mobilization over lending activities, whereas the private bank's expan~ 
sian should be biased towards lending operations. 
Both banks show cost complementarities (economies of scope) asso-
ciated with the joint production of loans and deposits. This finding 
argues against the strategy of creating a specialized lending institu-
tion with no deposit-mobilization functions. The joint provision of 
deposit services will not only improve the financial viability of the 
institution and promote financial savings, but also will reduce the 
marginal costs of lending through cost-complementarity effects. 
Interest-Rate Restrictions and Loan Targeting 
Interest-rate restrictions that reduced the level of real deposit 
rates or real lending rates had cost-increasing effects on financial 
intermediaries. This strongly suggests that increases in the level of 
real rates of interest would generate reductions in total intermediation 
costs. This trade-off between real rates and costs reflects the costs 
of regulatory-avoidance. Restrictions on deposit-rates force financial 
intermediaries to offer non-interest rewards to depositors in order to 
at least maintain their deposit balances. This is particularly impor-
tant in the Honduran case, where real deposit-rates have been low 
(usually negative) and unstable, thus discouraging the holding of finan-
cial savings. The provision of free banking services or preferential 
treatment in loan contracts to selected clients generate additional 
costs of deposit-mobilization for the institution, that could be avoided 
if explicit interest compensation could be paid to depositors. 
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On the other hand, multiple ceilings on lending rates constrained 
the ability of financial intermediaries to discriminate between poten-
tial borrowers in Honduras. In response to these constraints, financial 
institutions created rationing mechanisms of more complicated loan pro-
cedures that substituted for a more flexible interest-rate environment. 
This, in effect, passed on to borrowers a substantial part of the costs 
of intermediation. However, a proportion of these additional costs had 
to be borne by the lender, and this was reflected in the inverse rela-
tionship estimated between real lending-rate ceilings and lenders' 
intermediation costs. 
Loan targeting was found to be a cost-increasing factor affecting 
the development bank. Both foreign-funded projects and central-bank 
rediscount lines created additional intermediation costs, due to the 
increased resources that the bank devoted to accounting, monitoring, 
record-keeping and reporting, in order to comply with the requirements 
of targeted programs. 
Conclusions 
Financial intermediation costs in Honduras are substantial and vary 
widely depending on the conditions under which financial intermediaries 
and borrowers operate. These transaction costs associated with deposit-
mobilization, lending, and borrowing were two or three times the level 
of the deposit rates of interest received by savers. Part of the 
intermediaries' costs were explained by various forms of non-interest 
compensation paid for financial savings by intermediaries. In general, 
however, a good proportion of total intermediation costs have been 
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introduced into the financial system through the impact of financial 
regulations. 
An important implication of the results discussed here is that 
financial market regulations will not be effective, or their effects 
will be distorted by the regulatory circumvention response of financial 
intermediaries. The only certain effect of regulation was the increase 
of intermediation costs. Financial intermediaries will respond to 
deposit~rate ceilings through non-interest rewards to depositors. At 
the same time, they will counteract lending-rate ceilings through impli-
cit pricing. 
Only when the overall intensity of financial regulations restrict 
the ability of financial intermediaries to implicitly compensate deposi-
tors, will the total price received by savers decrease. This may have 
been one of the reasons underlying the decline in financial activities 
observed in Honduras after 1978. 
Policy-makers should consider both the real effectiveness and the 
costs of financial regulations when evaluating policy measures. The 
Honduran experience strongly suggests that for many of these measures 
costs will offset benefits, due to the effects of regulatory circumven-
tion. The development bank analyzed here provides a good example of the 
cost~increasing effects of creating a specialized institution to deal 
with agriculture. The usual social benefits that may be argued in sup-
port of this institution should be weighed against the less widely 
recognized social costs of maintaining and subsidizing these costly 
operations. In the end, taxpayers are providing the resources to cover 
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the bank's operational losses, thus distributional effects attributed to 
the institution should be adjusted accordingly. 
Transaction costs are a measure of the "friction" existing in the 
funetioning of financial markets. The higher the costs of inter-
mediation, the less efficient the performance of the financial sector in 
resource allocation and distribution. This study has shown that there 
are several ways in which transaction costs can be reduced, thus 
reducing the friction and improving financial-markets performance. 
Financial reforms that provide a more flexible interest-rate environment 
and reduce the cost-increasing burden of targeting schemes should 
greatly benefit the overall performance of the Honduran financial 
system. Maintaining the present set of financial regulations and 
targeting requirements will reduce potential resource mobilization 
within the Honduran financial sector and only add to the real costs of 
financial intermediation. 
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Table A.l. Development Bank: Estimated Parameters of the Cost Function, 
Including Loan-Size and Depgrlt-Size Effects. System Estimation 
with Two Output Definition~ 
Model (output definition) 
(1) (2} 
Number of loans Cq1>, 
Number of Deposit Accounts <q2> 
Value of Loans (q >, 
Deposit Balances <~2 > 
Parameter (Variable) 
0 (intercept) 
(, 1 Clnql' loans> 
,,2 (lnq2, deposits> 
, 1 < lnp1, price of labor) 
11 2 ( lnp2, price of capital> 
l 11 Clnq1>2 
-~ 22 ( I n q2) 2 
< lnq11nq2> 
(lnp1)2 
<lnp2)2 
~~ 12 ( I np1 I np2 > 
I' 11 <lnq1 1np1 > 
n 12 <lnq11np2> 
11 21 <I nq2 1 np1 > 
n22 <I nq21 np2> 
u1 Clnq1 1nLS, loan-size 
I nteractlon) 
0 2 Clnq2lnDS, deposit-size 
I nteractl on) 
R2 
F-value 
Weighted R2 (system) 
Estimate 
1 .6131 
-0.3023 
0.4123 
0.6710 
0.3290 
0.1116 
0.0027 
-0.0226 
0.0479 
0.0479 
-0.0479 
-0.0445 
0.0445 
-0.0356 
0.0356 
0.0858 
0.0527 
0.895~ 
76.03 
0.7848 
+-ratio 
(asymptotic> 
0.941 
-1.117 
0.769 
6. 793 
3.331* 
4.046* 
0.023 
-0.365 
5.564* 
5.564* 
-5.564* 
-5.513* 
5.513* 
-1.932t 
1.932t 
19.505* 
g. 786* 
Estimate 
6.0005 
0.5814 
-0.6449 
0.5585 
0.4415 
0.1463 
0.2619 
-0.0646 
0.0756 
0.0756 
-0.0756 
-0.0766 
0.0766 
-0.0103 
0.0103 
-0.0091 
-0.0180 
0.885~ 
68.86 
0.8168 
a/ Factor-price homogeneity and cross-equations restrictions Imposed on 
- estimation. DFS=304. 
Significance levels: *, .01; t, .05. 
b/ R2 of labor-share equation: Model (1) = 0.2775 <F = 14.79) 
Model (2) = 0.3116 <F = 17.42) 
+-ratio 
(asymptotic> 
11.489* 
5.787* 
-3.203* 
1 0.192* 
8.056* 
8.835* 
4.799* 
-2.693* 
8.041* 
8.041* 
-8.041* 
-9.542* 
9.542* 
-0.858 
0.858 
-2.332t 
-1.950t 
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Table A.2. Private Bank: Estimated Parameters of the Cost Function, 
Including Deposit-Stze Effects. Single Equation versus 
System Estimation.~/ 
(1) (2)----
Single Equation 
(OLS) 
System of 
Equations (GLS) 
Parameter (Variable) Estimate t-ratio 
t-ratio 
Estimate (asymptotic) 
''1 
,, 2 
i 1 
(intercept) 
(lnq1 , loans) 
(lnq 2, deposits) 
(lnp1 , price of labor) 
-3.1379 
-0.5526 
1.3148 
1.4563 
1'· 2 (lnp2, price of capital) -0.4563 
~11 (lnql) 2 0.0040 
r 22 (lnq 2) 2 -0.0567 
Y12 (lnq11nq2) 0.1384 
ell (lnpl) 2 -0.0404 
( 22 (lnp2) 2 -0.0404 
612 (lnp1lnp2) 0.0404 
n 11 (lnq11np1) 0.0064 
l1 12 (lnq11np2) -0.0064 
nzl (lnqzlnpl) -0.0538 
ilzz (1nq 21np2) o.0538 
u2 (lnq 21nDS, deposit-size -0.0227 
interaction) 
0.9745 
F-value 684 .92* 
Weighted R2 (system) 
-1.307 -3.0242 
-1.572 -0.7300 
2-621* 1.3405 
2.673* 1. 5913 
-0.837 -0.5913 
o.098 o.ono 
-0.777 -0.0142 
1.535 0.1134 
-0.542 -0.0508 
-0.542 -0.0508 
0.542 0.0508 
0.138 0.0366 
-0.138 -0.0366 
-0.872 -0.0894 
0.872 0.0894 
-2.768* -0.0247 
o.9769E..I 
489.52* 
0.9562 
-1.324 
-2.184t 
2.805* 
3.071* 
-1.141 
0.284 
-0.205 
1.323 
-0.715 
-0.715 
0.715 
0.829 
-0.829 
-1.522 
1.522 
-3.169* 
a/ Factor-price homogeneity restrictions imposed on estimation. N=l90. 
D~S = 365. Significance levels: *, .01; t, .05. 
~/ R of labor-share equation: 0.3590, F-ratio = 25.90. 
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Table A.3. Development Bank: Estimated Parameters of the Cost 
Function. Output Defined as Value of Loans (q1) and 
Deposit Balances (q 2). Single Equation versus 
System Estimation.~ 
Parameter (Variable) 
t\ 0 (intercept) 
~1 (lnq1 , value of loans) 
(1) 
Single Equation 
(OLS) 
Estimate t-ratio 
5.3210 9.817* 
0.1439 1.153 
System of 
Equations (GLS) 
t-ratio 
Estimate (asymptotic) 
4.7545 14.219* 
0.3434 4.890* 
C\2 (lnq2, deposit balances) 0.0163 
r. 1 (lnp1 , price of labor) 0.5439 
~ 2 (lnp2, price of capital) 0.4561 
0.101 
3.399* 
2.851* 
-0.1037 -1.188 
0.5776 14.385* 
0.4224 10.518* 
Y 11 (1nq1)2 
Y 22 (lnq2)2 
Y 12 (lnq1lnq2) 
o 11 (lnp1)2 
<~22 (lnp2)2 
o12 (lnp11np2) 
nu (lnqllnpl) 
n12 (lnq11np2) 
n 21 (lnq21np1) 
n 22 (lnq21np2) 
R2 
F-value 
Weighted R2 (system) 
0.0931 3.388* 0.1351 10.502* 
-0.0429 -1.211 0.0967 4.756* 
-0.0063 -0.257 -0.0113 -0.723 
0.0003 0.007 0.1022 13.729* 
0.0003 0.007 0.1022 13.729* 
-0.0003 -0.007 -0.1022 -13.729* 
-0.0426 -1.255 -0.0954 -14.914* 
0.0426 1.255 0.0954 14.914* 
0.0922 2.786* -0.0169 -2.029t 
-0.0922 -2.786* 0.0169 2.029t 
0.8491 0.8586~/ 
173.86* 117 .51* 
0.7331 
a/ Factor-price homogeneity restrictions imposed on all estimated 
equations. Cross-equations restrictions imposed on system 
e~timation. N=288. DFS=562. Significance levels: *, .01; t, .os. 
11 R of labor-share equation: 0.2886, F-ratio = 28.50. 
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Table A.4. Private Bank: Estimated Parameters of the/Cost Function, 
Single Equation versus System Estimation.~ 
(1) ( 2) 
Single Equation 
( OLS) 
System of 
Equations (GLS) 
t-ratio 
Parameter (Variable) Estimate t-ratio Estimate (asymptotic) ~~~~~~~~~------~~~~--~~~~. 
~0 (intercept) -4.0332 
<J. 1 (lnq1 , loans) -0.7159 
az (lnq2, deposits) 1.4888 
J1 (lnp1, price of labor) 1.5403 
:2 (lnp 2, price of capital) -0.5403 
.lll (1nq1)2 
Y2z (1nq2)2 
Y12 (1nq11nq2) 
0n (lnp1)2 
8 22 (lnpz)2 
u 12 (1np1lnp2) 
nu (1nq1lnp1) 
nlz (lnqllnp2) 
n 21 (lnq 2lnp1) 
n22 (lnq 2lnp2) 
R2 
F-value 
Weighted R2 (system) 
0.0097 
-0.0584 
0.1154 
-0.0481 
-0.0481 
0.0481 
0.0323 
-0.0323 
-0.0825 
0.0825 
o. 9734 
733 .04* 
-1.665° -4.0121 
-2.029t -0.8772 
2.938* 
2. 780* 
-0.975 
0.236 
-0.785 
1.262 
-0.633 
-0.633 
0.633 
0.697 
-0.697 
-1.331 
1.331 
1.5261 
1.6593 
-0.6593 
0.0160 
-0.0232 
0.0928 
-0.0572 
-0.0572 
0.0572 
0.0596 
-0.0596 
-0.1146 
O.ll46 
0.97582./ 
503.31* 
0.9536 
-2.595* 
3.139* 
3.126* 
-1.242 
0.404 
-0.325 
1.060 
-0.785 
-0.785 
0.785 
1.343 
-1.343 
-1.928t 
1.928t 
a/ Factor-price homogeneity restrictions imposed on estimation. 
N=190. DFS=365. 
Significance le11els: *, .01; t, .OS; 0 , .10. 
b/ R2 of labor-share equation: 0.3590, F-ratio = 25.90. 

